A rational account of classical logic argumentation for real-world agents by M. D&apos & S. Modgil
A Rational Account of Classical Logic Argumentation for
Real- orld Agents
M. D’Agostino and S.Modgil1
Abstract.
Classical logic based argumentation (ClAr) characterises sin-
gle agent non-monotonic reasoning and enables distributed non-
monotonic reasoning amongst agents in dialogues. However, features
of ClAr that have been shown sufﬁcient to ensure satisfaction of ra-
tionality postulates, preclude their use by resource bounded agents
reasoning individually, or dialectically in real-world dialogue. This
paper provides a new formalisation of ClAr that is both suitable
for such uses and satisﬁes the rationality postulates. We illustrate
by providing a rational dialectical characterisation of Brewka’s non-
monotonic Preferred Subtheories deﬁned under the assumption of
restricted inferential capabilities.
1 Introduction
Context. In Dung’s seminal theory of argumentation [13], arguments
are built from a possibly inconsistent knowledge base B. Attacks be-
tween arguments are deﬁned, and preferences over arguments can
then be used to decide whether one argument successfully attacks
(defeats) another [1, 18]. The graph of arguments and defeats is then
evaluated, based on the intuitive principle that an argument is justi-
ﬁed if all its defeaters are themselves defeated by justiﬁed arguments.
B’s argumentation deﬁned consequences are then the justiﬁed argu-
ments’ conclusions, and have been shown to correspond to the conse-
quence relations of a number of non-monotonic logics. For example,
classical logic arguments [15] are pairs (Δ, α) built from a base B
of classical wff, where the premises Δ are a consistent subset of B
that classically entail the conclusion α, and no proper subset of Δ
entails α. An argument X attacks Y if X’s conclusion negates one
of Y ’s premises. [2, 18] show that given preferences over arguments
deﬁned on the basis of a total ordering on B, the argumentation de-
ﬁned consequences correspond to the non-monotonic consequences
from B deﬁned by Preferred Subtheories (PS) [4].
Argumentation’s dialectical characterisation of non-monotonic
consequence, and the intuitive, familiar nature of the evaluative prin-
ciples, accounts for its widely advocated beneﬁts in enabling individ-
ual agent reasoning, and distributed (‘dialogical’) reasoning amongst
computational and/or human agents [19]. However, features of clas-
sical logic instantiations of Dung graphs (ClAr) posited to ensure sat-
isfaction of rationality postulates [5, 6], preclude its use by resource-
bounded agents reasoning dialectically2, either as individuals or in
real-world dialogues. Firstly, the consistency and subset minimality
checks on arguments’ premises incur prohibitive computational ex-
1 University of Milan, email: marcello.dagostino@unimi.it, and King’s Col-
lege London, email: sanjay.modgil@kcl.ac.uk
2 By ‘dialectic’ we mean ‘a method of examining and discussing opposing
ideas in order to ﬁnd the truth’ (www.merriam-webster.com).
pense. Moreover, the inconsistency of arguments’ premises are in
real-world argumentation established dialectically, by showing that
an interlocutor contradicts herself. On the other hand, the consis-
tency check ensures satisfaction of the non contamination postulates
[6]. Secondly, exclusively targeting attacks at an argument’s premises
leads to the so called ‘foreign commitment problem’ whereby an
agent is forced to commit to the premises of his interlocutor when at-
tacking his interlocutor’s arguments [16]. However, allowing attacks
on the conclusions of arguments results in violation of the consis-
tency postulates [5]. Thirdly, consistency may also be violated unless
one assumes that a Dung graph includes all arguments deﬁned by a
base B. However, this further precludes the use of ClAr by resource-
bounded agents.
Contributions This paper proposes a new account of ClAr that
is suitable for resource bounded agents reasoning individually and
in real-world dialogues, and is provably rational. We review back-
ground in Section 2, and then Section 3 presents our ﬁrst contribu-
tion. We propose a new dialectical ontology for ClAr arguments that
distinguishes amongst premises assumed true, and those assumed
true ‘for the sake of argument’. Agents are therefore not forced to
commit to the premises of their interlocutors despite the fact that at-
tacks are targeted at premises. We also accommodate the use of ClAr
by resource bounded agents, by not requiring consistency or subset
minimality checks on arguments’ premises, and, subject to intuitive
assumptions on available resources for constructing arguments, we
allow for instantiation of Dung graphs by subsets of arguments de-
ﬁned by a base. Our formalisation also accommodates the real-world
move whereby the mutual inconsistency of arguments’ premises is
demonstrated dialectically. We then provide an account of Preferred
Subtheories that assumes limited inferential resources, and show that
the deﬁned non-monotonic consequence relation corresponds to the
argumentation deﬁned consequences obtained by our dialectical for-
malisation of ClAr. Section 4 presents our second contribution. We
show that our approach satisﬁes key results that hold for Dung’s the-
ory3 despite our conservative adaptation of Dung’s evaluative prin-
ciples. We also show that despite satisfaction of the above desider-
ata for real-world applications of ClAr, the consistency and closure
postulates [5], as well as the non contamination postulates [6], are
satisﬁed. Section 5 concludes by discussing related and future work.
2 Background
We review classical logic instantiations of Dung graphs (ClAr)
[15, 18] that study [5]’s rationality postulates. We assume the
propositional language L consisting of atoms ⊥, a, b, c, . . . with the
3 We will refer the reader to [11] where space limitations preclude full details
of proofs in this paper.
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A = ({a},a) B = ({b},b)
C = ({   a        b},     a       b)¬ ∨ ¬  ¬ ∨ ¬  
¬ ∨ ¬  G = ({a ,    a        b } ,  b)¬¬ ∨ ¬  F = ({b ,    a        b } ,  a)¬
H = ({a , b } ,   (   a         b) )¬ ∨ ¬¬
Figure 1. Attacks on premises are solid arrows. Dotted arrows are
additional attacks if attacks can target conclusions.
usual connectives and deﬁnition of classical wff. Lower case and
upper case Greek letters (as well as the symbol B) respectively refer
to arbitrary classical wff and ﬁnite sets of classical wff. We assume
the complement function:
φ = ψ if φ is of the form ¬ψ; else φ = ¬φ
and let Cn(Δ) denote {α | Δ  α}, where  is the classical con-
sequence relation. The arguments A deﬁned by a base B of classi-
cal propositional wff, are pairs (Δ, α) where Δ ⊆ B, and: 1) the
premises Δ are consistent; 2) Δ  α; 3) no strict subset of Δ satis-
ﬁes 2.
[15] study ClAr assuming variously deﬁned notions of attacks.
[18] additionally assume a strict argument preference relation ≺
⊆ A×A (X ≺ Y denotes Y strictly preferred to X), and deﬁne at-
tacks and defeats as follows. For anyX = (Δ, α), Y = (Γ, β) ∈ A:
• X attacks Y (denoted (X,Y ) ∈ C) if α = γ for some γ ∈ Γ, in
which case X is said to attack Y on γ (or on ({γ}, γ)).
• X defeats Y (denoted (X,Y ) ∈ D) if X attacks Y on γ, and
X ⊀ ({γ}, γ) (X ⇒ Y (X  Y ) denotes that X does (not)
defeat Y ).
[18] study well known preference relations over arguments
that are deﬁned by an ordering ≤ over the formulae in B (where
< and ∼ are deﬁned in the usual way). In particular, for any
X = (Δ, α), Y = (Γ, β):
X ≺El Y if ∃δ ∈ Δ, ∀γ ∈ Γ: δ < γ (Elitist preference)
A Dung argumentation framework (AF ) is then a tuple (A,D). For
any E ⊆ A, X ∈ A is acceptable w.r.t. (i.e., defended by) E if ∀Y
s.t. Y defeats X , ∃Z ∈ E s.t. Z defeats Y . The extensions (sets
of justiﬁed arguments) can then be deﬁned under Dung’s semantics
[13]:
Deﬁnition 1 Let (A,D) be a AF . Then E ⊆ A is conﬂict free if
∀X,Y ∈ E: X  Y . For any conﬂict free E ⊆ A:
E is said to be an extension that is: admissible if every X ∈ E is
acceptable w.r.t. E; complete if admissible and every X ∈ A that is
acceptable w.r.t. E, is in E; grounded if E is the minimal (under set
inclusion) complete extension; preferred ifE is a maximal (under set
inclusion) complete extension; stable if every Y /∈ E is defeated by
an argument in E.
A correspondence then holds between the stable extensions of a
AF = (A,D) deﬁned by (B,≤) (where ≤ is total, and A, C,≺El, D
are deﬁned as above), and the widely studied Preferred Subtheories
(PS) non-monotonic consequence relations deﬁned over (B,≤) [4].
Deﬁnition 2 Let (B1, . . . ,Bn) be the stratiﬁcation of (B,≤) such
that α ∈ Bi, β ∈ Bj , i < j iff β < α. A preferred subtheory (ps) Σ
is a set Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σn such that for i = 1 . . . n, Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σi is a
⊆-maximal consistent subset of B1 ∪ . . . ∪ Bi.
Intuitively, a ps is obtained by taking a ⊆-maximal consistent
subset of B1, extending this with a ⊆-maximal consistent subset of
B2, and so on. For example, Σ = {a,¬a ∨ ¬b} and Σ′ = {a, b} are
the ps of (B1 = {a},B2 = {¬a ∨ ¬b, b}). [18] then show that:
Σ is a preferred subtheory of (B,≤) iff E is a stable extension of the
AF deﬁned by (B,≤), where Δ ⊆ Σ iff (Δ, α) ∈ E.
One then obtains a correspondence between the PS non-monotonic
consequences and the argumentation deﬁned consequences. These
can be deﬁned either sceptically:
{α | ∀Σ : Σ  α} = {α | ∀E : ∃(Δ, α) ∈ E}
or credulously, which involves selecting the classical consequences
of a single ps, equivalently the conclusions of arguments in a single
stable extension. For example, Figure 1 shows some of the arguments
and attacks (represented as solid arrows) deﬁned by ({a, b,¬a ∨
¬b}, b ∼ ¬a ∨ ¬b < a). The ordering determines that F ≺El A,
hence F  A,F  H,F  G, and the remaining attacks succeed
as defeats. Then {A,C,G} and {A,H,B} are, respectively, subsets
of the two stable extensions E and E′, and α is a conclusion of an
argument in E iff α ∈ Cn({a,¬a ∨ ¬b}), α is a conclusion of an
argument in E′ iff α ∈ Cn({a, b}).
A number of features of ClAr ensure that rationality postulates for
argumentation are satisﬁed.
Firstly, the consistency check on arguments’ premises ensures sat-
isfaction of the non contamination postulates [6]. Essentially, these
postulates state that arguments built from syntactically disjoint sub-
sets of B should not impact on each other’s justiﬁcation status. To
illustrate, suppose B = {p,¬p, s}, and suppose we allow the ‘incon-
sistent argument’ Y = ({p,¬p},¬s) which attacks X = ({s}, s).
Then (assuming ≺= ∅) there is a complete extension (the grounded
extension) that does not include X4. However, intuitively the status
ofX should not be affected by arguments built from the syntactically
disjoint {p,¬p}.
Secondly, exclusively targeting attacks on arguments’ premises
ensures satisfaction of the consistency postulates [5]. To see why,
observe that if attacks on conclusions are additionally permitted (as
illustrated by the dotted attacks in Figure 1), then (assuming ≺= ∅),
one obtains an additional stable extension containing {A,B,C},
whose conclusions are mutually inconsistent.
Thirdly, in ClAr it is tacitly assumed that all arguments deﬁned by
B are included in the AF for evaluation. In particular:
if (Γ, α) ∈ A, then ∀γ ∈ Γ, (Γ \ {γ} ∪ {α}, γ) ∈ A
(contraposition)
is posited as sufﬁcient for satisfaction of the consistency postulates.
To illustrate, suppose in Figure 1’s example, that the AF only in-
cludes F and A, and let F ≺ A. Then neither A or F defeat each
other, and both are contained in a complete extension E that violates
consistency. However, assuming contraposition the AF must addi-
tionally include G and H . Moreover, [18] also show that if F ≺ A,
and ≺ satisﬁes properties that are deemed ‘reasonable’, then it must
be that either G ⊀ B or H ⊀ C, and so either G defeats F on B,
or H defeats F on C. But then E cannot be complete. To see why, if
4 In general, all arguments in anAF will be attacked by arguments built from
inconsistent premises (given the ex-falso principle), and it is well known
that ∅ is the grounded extension of an AF that contains no un-attacked
arguments.
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either G or H defeats F , then by assumption of E being complete,
there must be an argument in E that defends F by defeating G or H .
But then any such argument must also defeatA or F , and soE would
not be conﬂict free. Hence, contraposition and reasonable preference
relations are shown to guarantee satisfaction of consistency (note that
[18] show that the Elitist preference is reasonable).
3 Dialectical Classical Logic Argumentation
3.1 Motivation
Apart from its intuitive characterisation of single agent reasoning,
a key advantage of argumentation [19] is that it provides a for-
mal basis for dialogue amongst computational and/or human agents
[17]. Given argumentative characterisations of non-monotonic con-
sequence relations (e.g. Logic Programming [13], Prioritised Default
Logic [23] and Preferred Subtheories [18]), such dialogues effec-
tively enable distributed non-monotonic reasoning amongst commu-
nicating agents. Agents submit arguments5 in order to establish ac-
ceptance of the initial claim (a belief or decision option). Intuitively,
the agent advocating the initial claim, attempts to build an admissible
extension that includes an argument concluding the claim. In these
dialogues, a base Bp is incrementally deﬁned by the agents’ ‘public
commitments’; that is, the contents of exchanged locutions (rather
than assuming a given initial base in the case of single agent rea-
soning), and agents can construct arguments from premises in their
private bases and the incrementally deﬁned Bp.
However, we argue that the three features of ClAr shown to ensure
satisfaction of rationality postulates (as discussed in the previous sec-
tion): 1) preclude use of ClAr by resource bounded agents reasoning
individually or in dialogues, and; 2) preclude modelling features of
dialectical reasoning that are ubiquitous in real-world dialogue.
Firstly, the tacit assumption that an AF is instantiated by all ar-
guments deﬁned by a base B, is clearly not feasible for resource
bounded agents, given that deciding whetherΔ  α is in general NP-
hard (hence most likely intractable). One would thus want to identify
as ‘undemanding’ a set of assumptions as possible on available re-
sources for constructing arguments, such that rationality is preserved
when AF s are not instantiated by all deﬁnable arguments (D1).
In particular one would want to relax the contraposition condi-
tion. To illustrate, suppose arguments are classical Intelim natural
deduction (I-ND) proofs [9]. I-ND allows parameterisation of proofs
by the depth of nesting of discharged assumptions, such that step-
wise increments in depth deﬁne a hierarchy of tractable inference
relations, and each depth bounded system can be used to reﬂect
the assumed inferential capabilities of real-world agents. Now, sup-
pose Ag1 submits arguments whose premises include the inconsis-
tent Π = {p, p → ¬q, p → q}. Ag2 can respectively attack these
premises with A = ({p → q, p → ¬q},¬p) or B = ({p, p →
q},¬(p → ¬q)), or C = ({p, p → ¬q},¬(p → q)). Assuming
≺ is reasonable, one such attack must be a defeat. Hence Ag1 must
defend itself by submitting an argument that defeats A or B or C.
But then this argument must defeat one of Ag1’s own arguments on
a premise in Π, and so Ag1 cannot construct an admissible set con-
taining the arguments with premises Π. However, suppose neither of
the attacks byB andC succeed, so thatAg2must defeat withA. But
then it may be that Ag2 has insufﬁcient resources to construct A (in-
deed, in I-ND, constructing A requires greater nesting of discharged
assumptions than B or C) and so Ag1 may be able to construct an
5 Arguments may be deﬁned implicitly, e.g., ({q, q → p}, p) obtained by
claiming q and (responding to a ‘why’ locution) asserting ‘since q, q → p’.
admissible extension containing arguments with mutually inconsis-
tent premises.
Furthermore, the computational non-viability of ClAr is further
exacerbated by the checks on arguments’ premises. Checking for
consistency is of course as computationally demanding as deciding
Δ  α6. Moreover, the subset minimality check implies that for ev-
ery constructed argument (Δ, α), one must in the worst case check
that ∀Δ′ ⊂ Δ, Δ′ c α. Hence, for resource bounded agents one
would want a rational account of ClAr that does not require checking
for consistency or subset minimality of premises (D2).
Moreover, in real-world dialogues, the inconsistency of argu-
ments’ premises is typically established dialectically, via the well
known Socratic move of demonstrating that an opponent’s argu-
ment(s) rests on inconsistent premises [7, 21]. Also, in real-world
dialogues one wants to avoid the anomaly of an agent being forced
to commit to the premises of his interlocutor (known as the ‘foreign
commitment problem’ [16]), which arises due to restricting attacks
to targeting premises. To illustrate, consider an agent Ag1 submit-
ting A in Figure 1. Ag2 counters with F . Ag1 cannot now counter
F with A, but rather has to publically commit to a premise of his
opponent (either b or ¬a ∨ ¬b), by defending A with either H or G,
and so having to possibly defend these premises from challenges by
other agents. Hence, one would want an account of ClAr that accom-
modates the dialectical demonstration that arguments’ premises are
inconsistent (D3) and avoids the foreign commitment problem (D4).
3.2 Deﬁning Dialectical Argumentation
We now formalise an account of ClAr that satisﬁes the desiderata D1
– D4. Our starting point is the observation that when interlocutors
construct arguments, they typically distinguish their own premises
that they accept as true, from the premises that their opponent com-
mits to and that they want to criticise: “on the basis of the premises
I regard to be true, and supposing for the sake of argument what you
regard to be true, then I can show some conclusion that contradicts
one of your premises”. This pattern is pervasive in real argumen-
tation practice, and motivates the following deﬁnition of arguments
in which we also drop the consistency and subset minimality checks.
Attacks are then targeted only at premises and not suppositions. Also,
arguments may now conclude ⊥, and these can target any premise.
However, letting atoms(B) denote the set of propositional atoms in
B, we henceforth assume ﬁnite bases B such that ⊥ /∈ atoms(B)
(i.e., ⊥ is reserved as a notational device to express that an inconsis-
tency has been reached in the course of constructing an argument).
Deﬁnition 3 A dialectical argument X deﬁned by B is a triple
(Δ,Γ, α) such that (Δ ∪ Γ) ⊆ B and α ∈ Cn(Δ ∪ Γ).
We say that Δ, Γ and α are, respectively, X’s premises, suppositions
and conclusion. We let prem(X) = Δ, supp(X) = Γ, and
generalise this notation to sets of arguments in the obvious way.
Also, if Cn(Δ ∪ Γ) = L then X is said to be inconsistent; else
X is consistent. Finally, if supp(X) = ∅ then X is said to be
unconditional; else X is conditional.
Let A be the dialectical arguments deﬁned by B. Then:
C = {(X,Y ) | X,Y ∈ A, X = (Δ,Γ, φ)(φ = α or φ = ⊥),
Y = (Π,Σ, ψ) and if φ = α then α ∈ Π}.
If φ = α, X is said to attack Y on premise α; equivalently, on the
6 Consistency checking is computationally hard not just for isolated or artiﬁ-
cially constructed examples, but also in typical cases, as shown in [8].
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argument Y ′ = ({α}, ∅, α). If φ = ⊥, X attacks Y on any β ∈ Π
(any Y ′ = ({β}, ∅, β)).
In dialogues, agents can suppose the truth of premises in their
interlocutors’ argument(s), when attacking their interlocutors’ argu-
ments. This motivates the following notion of dialectical attacks:
Deﬁnition 4 Let S ⊆ A. Then X ∈ A dialectically attacks Y ∈
A, with respect to S (denoted X →S Y ) iff (X,Y ) ∈ C and
supp(X) ⊆ prem(S).
Example 1 The dialectical arguments A deﬁned by B =
{a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b} include:
A1 = ({a}, ∅, a) B1 = ({b}, ∅, b)
C1 = ({¬a ∨ ¬b}, ∅,¬a ∨ ¬b) F1 = ({b,¬a ∨ ¬b}, ∅,¬a)
G1 = ({a,¬a ∨ ¬b}, ∅,¬b) H1 = ({a, b}, ∅,¬(¬a ∨ ¬b))
F2 = ({b}, {¬a ∨ ¬b},¬a) G2 = ({a}, {¬a ∨ ¬b},¬b)
H2 = ({a}, {b},¬(¬a ∨ ¬b)) I1 = ({a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b}, ∅,⊥)
I2 = (∅, {a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b},⊥)
Notice that G1 and G2 are epistemically distinguished by the
partitioning of premises and suppositions, but are ‘logically equiv-
alent’7. In what follows, we refer to preference relations that are in-
variant modulo logical equivalence.
Deﬁnition 5 Let X = (Δ,Γ, α). Then:
• [X] = {X ′ = (Δ′,Γ′, α) | Δ′ ∪ Γ′ = Δ ∪ Γ}.
∀Y, Z ∈ [X] we say that Y and Z are logically equivalent.
• ≺⊆ A×A is invariant modulo logical equivalence (imle) if
Y ≺ X implies ∀X ′ ∈ [X], ∀Y ′ ∈ [Y ] : Y ′ ≺ X ′
We now deﬁne dialectical defeat, acceptability and extensions un-
der Dung’s semantics. Any defeating argument Y challenging the
acceptability of X w.r.t. E, can suppose the truth of premises in ar-
guments in E, and any defense against Y can suppose the truth of
premises in Y :
Deﬁnition 6 Let (A, C,≺) be a Dialectical Classical Framework
(DCF ) where A, C are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 3, and ≺ is imle.
•X ∈ A defeats Y ∈ A, with respect to S ⊆ A (denotedX ⇒S Y )
iff X →S Y on Y ′, and X ⊀ Y ′.
• Let E ⊆ A. Then X ∈ A is acceptable w.r.t. E iff ∀Y ∈ A s.t.
Y ⇒E∪{X} X , ∃Z ∈ E s.t. Z ⇒{Y } Y .
Conﬂict free sets and extensions of DCF s are deﬁned as in Def-
inition 1, where E ⊆ A is now conﬂict free if for no X,Y ∈ E,
X ⇒E∪{Y } Y , and an extension is stable if ∀Y /∈ E, ∃X ∈ E s.t.
X ⇒{Y } Y . The argumentation deﬁned consequences are then the
conclusions of unconditional arguments8 in extensions of a DCF .
Example 2 (Example 1 cont.) Suppose {A1, G1, G2, C1} ⊆ E,
F1 ⊀ A1. Then:
F1 ⇒E∪{A1} A1. Also, F2 ⇒E∪{A1} A1 since {¬a ∨ ¬b} ⊆
prem(E ∪ {A1}) and ≺ is imle.
G1 attacks F1 and F2 on b (on B1), and G2 →{F1} F1 on B1, but
G2 {F2} F2 since supp(G2)  prem(F2).
SupposeG1 ⊀ B1. Hence,G1 ⇒{F1} F1,G1 ⇒{F2} F2, and since
≺ is imle, G2 ⇒{F1} F1.
7 In the sense that they are identical proofs distinguished only by the dis-
tinction between premises and suppositions. This is a stronger notion
of equivalence than that which would apply to ({a, b}, ∅, a ∧ b) and
({a ∧ b}, ∅, a ∧ b).
8 Since their conclusions are based only on premises assumed true, and not
premises supposed true for the sake of argument.
Continuing with this example, suppose the Elitist preference ≺El
deﬁned by an ordering≤ on B. We illustrate how the desiderata D1 –
D4 are satisﬁed. We will formally show satisfaction of the rationality
postulates in Section 4
(D4) Suppose an admissible extensionE1 containingA1, such that
F1 ⇒E A1 (when a defeat is on X ∈ E we will index the defeat
with E rather than E ∪ {X}). Now, rather than defending A1 with
G1, it sufﬁces to includeG2 in E1 in order to defeat F1. G2 does not
include as a premise (and so does not imply commitment to and the
potential need to defend) the opponent’s premise ¬a ∨ ¬b.
(D2) Note that any argument in E1 will be attacked (on any
premise) by the inconsistent I1. However, I2, which has empty
premises and so cannot be attacked (and is therefore said to be unas-
sailable), is trivially acceptable w.r.t. any set of arguments, and so
can be included in E1. I2 attacks I1 (since supp(I2) ⊆ prem(I1))
on each of I1’s premises (i.e., on A1, B1 and C1), and at least one of
these attacks must succeed as a defeat. To suppose otherwise would
mean that I2 ≺El A1, I2 ≺El B1 and I2 ≺El C1. But it is easy to
verify that these preferences hold only if we assume α < α for some
α ∈ {a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b}, contradicting the irreﬂexivity of <. This il-
lustrates how non-contamination is satisﬁed, despite arguments with
inconsistent premises. Recall the example base {p,¬p, s} in Section
3.1. Then X = ({s}, ∅, s) is in every complete extension E, since
even though I = ({p,¬p}, ∅,¬s) may defeat X , any such E will
include the unassailable (∅, {p,¬p},⊥) which must (by the same
reasoning as above) defeat I on p or ¬p, and so defend X .
(D3) Furthermore, we can now formalise the dialectical move
whereby one shows that an interlocutor contradicts himself. Recall
Section 3.1 and the arguments with inconsistent premises p, p →
¬q, p → q. Any E that includes these arguments cannot be admis-
sible since given I = (∅, {p, p → ¬q, p → q},⊥), then I →E X
for any X ∈ E, and (reasoning as above) either I ⇒E ({p}, ∅, p)
or I ⇒E ({p → ¬q}, ∅, p → ¬q) or I ⇒E ({p → q}, ∅, p → q).
Since I is unassailable, no argument in E can defend against I .
(D1) The above illustrates that consistency is preserved, despite
not having to assume all arguments deﬁned under contraposition. We
now deﬁne the notion of a partially instantiated DCF (pDCF ),
which makes a relatively undemanding (in terms of the required re-
sources) set of assumptions as to the arguments that must be included
in a DCF and that sufﬁce to guarantee satisfaction of the rationality
postulates. One can thus, for example, assume instantiation by a ﬁnite
subset of the arguments deﬁned by a base, and so accommodate uses
of argumentation by real-world agents with limited resources. Before
deﬁning pDCF s, we introduce the following required notation:
Notation 3 B‖B′ denotes atoms(B) ∩ atoms(B′) = ∅ (B and B′ are
said to be syntactically disjoint). Also, B|At = {α ∈ B | atoms({α})
⊆ At} (e.g., {¬a ∨ ¬b, c ∧ a}|{a,b} = {¬a ∨ ¬b}).
Deﬁnition 7 (A, C,≺) is a partially instantiated DCF (pDCF ) if
A is any subset of the set of all arguments deﬁned by a base B, such
that:
P1 ∀α ∈ B : ({α}, ∅, α) ∈ A
P2 If X ∈ A then ∀X ′ ∈ [X] : X ′ ∈ A
P3 If (Δ1,Γ1, α) ∈ A, (Δ2,Γ2, α) ∈ A, then (Δ1 ∪ Δ2,Γ1 ∪
Γ2,⊥) ∈ A.
P4 If (Δ ∪ Γ, ∅, α) ∈ A and Δ‖Γ ∪ {α}, then either (Δ, ∅,⊥) ∈ A
or (Γ, ∅, α) ∈ A.
P1 is self-explanatory. P2 expresses that given some X , additional
resources are not required to assume construction of logically equiv-
alent arguments (since these differ only in terms of the epistemic dis-
tinction between premises and suppositions). P3 is key for showing
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consistency. It expresses that given arguments with conﬂicting con-
clusions, then resources sufﬁce to combine their premises and sup-
positions to yield inconsistent arguments. To illustrate, in Example
1, suppose we only assume construction of the conﬂicting A1 and
F1, and F1 ≺ A1. By P3 and P2, we have the unassailable I2 which
must (reasoning as described earlier) defeat F1 or A1. Hence no ad-
missible extension can include the conﬂicting F1 and A1, despite
the absence of arguments deﬁned under contraposition.
Finally, P4 is required to show satisfaction of the non-
contamination postulates. To elaborate, since standard accounts of
ClAr make no reference to speciﬁc proof theories for constructing
arguments, they employ subset minimality as a somewhat ‘blunt in-
strument’ for ensuring that premises are relevant to deriving the argu-
ment’s conclusion9. However, in practice agents clearly do not check
for subset minimality. Rather, the proof theoretic means by which
one entails a conclusion from premises, may ensure to varying de-
grees, the relevance of the premises for deriving the conclusion. Now,
let us identify a notion of relevance that in principle can be satisﬁed
by speciﬁc proof theories. Observe that by the properties of classical
logic, if Δ∪Γ  α, Δ‖Γ∪{α}, and α is not a tautology, then either
α is provable from Γ (in which case Δ is redundant) or α must be
provable from the inconsistent Δ by the explosivity of classical logic
(in which case Γ is redundant). Of course, if α is a tautology, then
Γ  α. Indeed, the I-ND natural deduction proof theory of [9] allows
for a notion of proof that does not make use of syntactically disjoint
premises; thus irrelevant proofs of this kind cannot be constructed
(see [10, Deﬁnition 15, Theorem 9]). However, for proof theories
that do allow such proofs, P4 simply states that if resources sufﬁce to
construct an argument that redundantly uses premises, then resources
sufﬁce to construct their non-redundant versions 10.
We now show that Dialectical ClAr characterises Preferred Sub-
theories, where the latter is now deﬁned under the assumption that
resources may not sufﬁce to infer all classical consequences from a
base.
Deﬁnition 8 Let r ⊆  be any resource bounded classical conse-
quence relation, such that: 1) for any Δ, if β ∈ Δ then Δ r β; 2) if
Δ r α and Δ r ¬α then Δ r ⊥.
We say Δ is r-inconsistent iff Δ r ⊥; r-consistent otherwise. A r-
preferred subtheory of (B,≤) is then deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 2, with
‘r-consistent’ substituting for ‘consistent’.
The following uses the notation Args(Σ) = {X | prem(X) ⊆ Σ}.
Theorem 4 Let (A, C,≺El) be a pDCF deﬁned by (B,≤), such that
(Δ,Γ, α) ∈ A iff Δ ∪ Γ r α. Then:
1) Σ is a r-preferred subtheory of (B,≤) implies E = Args(Σ) is a
stable extension of (A, C,≺El).
2) E is a stable extension of (A, C,≺El) implies Σ =⋃
X∈E Prem(X) is a r-preferred subtheory of B.
PROOF.
Proof of 1): Suppose for contradiction that E is not conﬂict free.
Then X,Y ∈ E, X = (Δ,Γ, φ) (φ = ⊥ or β), X ⇒E Y on
9 Clearly arguments may not be subset minimal and yet use all the premises
to derive a conclusion, e.g., two applications of modus ponens deriving q
from p, p → q, p → ((p → q) → q).
10 For example, consider r provable from (Γ = {p, p → r}) ∪ (Δ = {q}).
Assuming natural deduction rules, one could by ∧I obtain p ∧ q, then by
∧E , p, and then by →E , r from p and p → r. Clearly, such a proof, which
redundantly makes use of q, implies sufﬁcient resources for a proof of r
from Γ (by a single application of →E ).
β ∈ prem(Y ). We have Σ r β. Since Γ ⊆ prem(Y ) ⊆ prem(E),
then Σ r ⊥ or β. Either case contradicts Σ is r-consistent.
Suppose Y ∈ A \ E. Hence ∃γ ∈ prem(Y ), γ /∈ Σ. We show
∃X ∈ E,X ⇒{Y } Y . By construction, Σ = Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σn
such that for i = 1 . . . n, Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σi is a maximal r-
consistent subset of B1, . . . ,Bi. Hence, suppose γ ∈ Bj for
some j = 1 . . . n. Then Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σj ∪ {γ} r ⊥. Hence
X = (Δ, {γ},⊥) ∈ Args(Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σj) ⊆ E s.t. X ⇀{Y } Y .
Since γ ∈ Bj , and Δ ⊆ ⋃jk=1 Bk, X ⊀El ({γ}, ∅, γ). Hence
X ⇒{Y } Y .
Proof of 2): Suppose for contradiction that Σ =
⋃
X∈E Prem(X)
is not r-consistent (i.e., Σ r ⊥). Then Z = (∅,Σ,⊥) ∈ A. By
properties of ≺El (see Section 3.2) ∃α ∈ Σ, Z ⊀ ({α}, ∅, α).
Hence ∃B ∈ E, Z ⇒E B on α. No argument in E can defeat the
unassailable Z, contradicting E is stable.
Suppose for contradiction that Σ is not ⊆-maximal r-consistent. Let
Σ1, . . . ,Σn partition Σ s.t. for i = 1 . . . n, Σi is a (possibly empty)
subset of Bi. Then, for some i, for k = 1 . . . i − 1, Σ1, . . . ,Σk is a
⊆-maximal r-consistent subset of B1, . . . ,Bi−1, and ∃α ∈ Bi s.t.:
i) α /∈ Σi ii) Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σi−1 ∪ Σi ∪ {α} r ⊥.
Given i), ∃Y = ({α}, ∅, α) ∈ A, Y /∈ E. Since E is stable,
∃X ∈ E, X ⇒{Y } Y , hence X ⊀El Y . Consider two cases:
• Suppose X concludes ⊥. It cannot be that supp(X) = ∅, since
this would imply prem(X)  ⊥, contradicting the r-consistency of
Σ. Hence X = (Δ, {α},⊥).
• Suppose X concludes α, prem(X) = Δ, supp(X) = ∅ or {α}.
By P3 and P2 (Def.7), ∃X ′ = (Δ, {α},⊥). Since X and X ′ have
the same premises, and E is complete, then (by [11, Lemma 14])
X ′ ∈ E. Since X ⊀El Y then ∀β ∈ Δ, β ≮ α, and so X ′ ⊀El Y
and X ′ ⇒{Y } Y .
Given ii), it must be that ∃β ∈ Δ, s.t. β ∈ Ej , j > i. But then
X ≺El Y , respectively X ′ ≺El Y , contradicting X ⊀El Y , re-
spectively X ′ ⊀El Y .
QED
As in Section 2, this result establishes a correspondence between
the PS and argumentation consequence relations, where the latter are
conclusions of unconditional arguments in stable extensions.
4 Properties and Postulates
4.1 Dung’s Fundamental Lemma and
Monotonicity of the Characteristic Function
We now study two key properties of AF s [13] as they apply to
pDCF s. Firstly, the Fundamental Lemma (FL) states that:
if X,X ′ are acceptable w.r.t. an admissible E, then E ∪ {X}
is admissible and X ′ is acceptable w.r.t. E ∪ {X}.
Secondly, an AF ’s characteristic function F is deﬁned as:
F(S) = {X | X is acceptable w.r.t. S} where S ⊆ A
Hence, the ﬁxed points of F are an AF ’s complete extensions. Then
F is shown to be monotonic: E ⊆ E′ implies F(E) ⊆ F(E′).
For pDCF s, the FL and monotonicity of a pDCF ’s charac-
teristic function cannot straightforwardly be shown, since proofs
of these properties rely on the fact that attacks and defeats on any
argument X is ﬁxed and independent of the premises in a given
set E. However, we can show similar properties for ‘epistemically
closed’ sets E that enjoy the following property:
if W = (Π,Σ, β) ∈ E, then for any Σ′ ⊆ Σ such that
Σ′ ⊆ prem(E), E also includes W ′ = (Π ∪ Σ′,Σ \ Σ′, β).
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Epistemically closed sets are so named, as commitment to premises
Σ′ in E implies commitment to the logically equivalent W ′.
Deﬁnition 9 Let Clec(E) = E ∪ {W ′ | W ∈ E,W ′ ∈ [W ],
prem(W ) ⊆ prem(W ′), prem(W ′) ⊆ prem(E)}.
Then E is epistemically closed (ec) if E = Clec(E).
Proofs of the following two propositions are shown in [11, Lemma
19] and [11, Lemma 23] respectively .
Proposition 5 Let X,X ′ be acceptable w.r.t. an admissible exten-
sion E of a pDCF (A, C,≺). Then:
1. Clec(E ∪ {X}) is admissible.
2. X ′ is acceptable w.r.t. Clec(E ∪ {X}).
Proposition 6 Let E,E′ be two ec admissible extensions of
(A, C,≺) such that E ⊆ E′. Then F(E) ⊆ F(E′).
We sketch a key step in the proof of Proposition 5 that illustrates
the importance of assuming epistemically closed sets.
Suppose X acceptable w.r.t. an admissible E where Y ∈ E. In-
clusion of X in E may mean Z ⇒E∪{X} Y , but Z E Y , since:
Z = (Δ,Γ, φ), Φ ⊆ Γ and Φ ⊆ prem(X), Φ  prem(E).
Since Z E Y , we cannot assume that the admissibility of E im-
plies some Q in E (and hence E ∪ {X}) defeating Z. Hence, we
cannot immediately assume that Y is acceptable w.r.t. E ∪{X}, and
so E ∪ {X} is admissible.
However we can show that there is an argument inClec(E∪{X})
that defeats Z. Consider the following line of reasoning:
• Z′ ⇒E Y where Z′ = (Δ ∪ Φ,Γ \ Φ, φ)
• Hence ∃W = (Π,Σ, β) ∈ E, W ⇒{Z′} Z′
• Note: Σ ⊆ Δ ∪ Φ and Π ∪ Φ ⊆ prem(E ∪ {X}) (1)
Consider two cases:
a) Suppose W defeats Z′ on α ∈ Φ.
We have the logically equivalent W ′ = (Σ ∩Δ,Π ∪ (Σ ∩ Φ), β).
Given (1),W ′ ⇒E∪{X} X . SinceX is acceptable w.r.t.E, ∃Q ∈ E
s.t. Q ⇒{W ′} W ′. Since prem(W ′) ⊆ prem(Z), then Q ⇒{Z} Z.
b) Suppose W defeats Z′ on a premise in Δ. We have W ′ = (Π ∪
(Σ∩Φ),Σ∩Δ, β),W ′ ⇒{Z} Z. Given (1) and the assumption that
E ∪ {X} is epistemically closed, then W ′ ∈ E ∪ {X}.
Proposition 5 sufﬁces to prove a key result implied by the FL:
Proposition 7 Every admissible extension of a pDCF is a subset of
a preferred extension.
See [11, Proposition 22] for proof of the above. Proposition 6, to-
gether with the fact that every ﬁxed point of F is epistemically
closed, facilitates proof of a key result following from the mono-
tonicity of F (the proof of which is shown in [11, Proposition 25]):
Proposition 8 The characteristic function F of a pDCF has a
unique least ﬁxed point (the grounded extension).
4.2 Rationality Postulates
We now show that the rationality postulates in [5] and [6] are satis-
ﬁed, under some intuitive assumptions on preference relations.
Recall that in Example 1, no admissible extension contains the
conﬂicting A1 and F1 since the unassailable I2 must defeat either
A1, or F1 on B1, or F1 on C1. To suppose otherwise implies
I2 ≺ A1, I2 ≺ B1, and I2 ≺ C1. But such a preference relation
would be incoherent as one would be rejecting the dialectical
demonstration that A1 and F1 make use of mutually inconsistent
premises, and effectively prefers arguments built from inconsistent
premises. Indeed, in general, a strict preference Y ≺ X , where
Y = (Δ,Γ, φ) attacks X = ({α}, ∅, α), can be interpreted as:
from amongst the inconsistent Δ∪Γ∪{α}, one preferentially
accepts arguments constructed from α and rejects arguments
constructed from Δ ∪ Γ.
Hence I1 ≺ A1, I1 ≺ B1, and I1 ≺ C1 collectively indi-
cate preferentially accepting arguments built from the inconsistent
{a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b} and rejecting arguments built from {a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b}.
Contradiction.
Given the above interpretation of Y ≺ X it should follow that
Y ′ ≺ X , where Y ′ = (Δ,Γ ∪ {α}, φ) (φ = α or φ = ⊥). Hence, if
F1 ≺ A1 then ({b,¬a ∨ ¬b}, {a},¬a) ⊀ A1 would be incoherent.
Similarly, if ({b,¬a ∨¬b}, {a},¬a) ≺ A1 then F1 ⊀ A1 would be
incoherent. We therefore assume that preference relations satisfy the
following properties:
Deﬁnition 10 Let (A, C,≺) be a pDCF . Then ≺ is dialectically
coherent iff:
∀(∅,Δ,⊥) ∈ A: ∃α ∈ Δ such that (∅,Δ,⊥) ⊀ ({α}, ∅, α).
(Pref1)
∀X = ({α}, ∅, α), Y = (Δ,Γ, φ), Y ′ = (Δ,Γ∪{α}, φ) (φ = α
or φ = ⊥): Y ≺ X iff Y ′ ≺ X . (Pref2)
We prove [5]’s closure and consistency rationality postulates for
pDCFs, under the assumption that ≺ is dialectically coherent (note,
one can straightforwardly show that the Elitist ≺El is dialectically
coherent). [5] state theses postulates with reference to complete
extensions. Also, recall (Section 3 and footnote 8), that the argu-
mentation based consequences are the conclusions of unconditional
arguments. Hence we deﬁne:
conc(E) = {φ | (Δ, ∅, φ) ∈ E}.
[5]’s postulates are stated with respect to a general framework for ar-
gumentation logics that integrate deductive and defeasible reasoning,
so that arguments are trees whose links denote application of strict
and defeasible inference rules, and sub-arguments correspond to sub-
trees. [18] extend the framework to accommodate ClAr, in which ar-
guments are constructed from premises (the leaf nodes) that entail a
conclusion (root node), via application of a single strict inference rule
encoding the classical entailment. Hence, for ClAr, an argument X
is a tree of depth 1, whose leaves are the ‘elementary’ arguments as-
sociated with the premises of X , and are X’s sub-arguments. There-
fore, we have the following formulation of the sub-argument postu-
late which [5] state as: if X is in a complete extension E, then all
sub-arguments of X are in E:
Theorem 9 [Sub-argument Closure] Let E be a complete exten-
sion of a pDCF (A, C,≺), andX ∈ E. Then for allα ∈ prem(X) :
({α}, ∅, α) ∈ E.
PROOF. By P1 (Deﬁnition 7),X ′ = ({α}, ∅, α) ∈ A. If Y ⇒E∪{X′}
X ′, then Y ⇒E∪{X} X (on X ′). Since E is complete, X is accept-
able w.r.t.E and so ∃Z ∈ E s.t.Z ⇒{Y } Y . HenceX ′ is acceptable
w.r.t. E, and since E is complete, X ′ ∈ E. QED
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We now prove that direct consistency holds more generally for
admissible, and not just complete, extensions.
Theorem 10 [Direct Consistency] Let E be an admissible exten-
sion of a pDCF (A, C,≺). Then ∀α, β ∈ conc(E), α = ⊥ and
α = β.
PROOF. Suppose for contradiction that E contains X = (Δ, ∅, α)
and Y = (Γ, ∅, β), and 1) α = ⊥, or 2) α = β. Suppose 1) is the
case. By P2, Z = (∅,Δ,⊥) ∈ A. Suppose 2) is the case. By P3,
∃Z′ = (Δ∪Γ, ∅,⊥) ∈ A. By P2, Z = (∅,Δ∪Γ,⊥) ∈ A. In either
case, supp(Z) ⊆ prem(E). Hence ∀β ∈ supp(Z), ∃W ∈ E s.t.
Z →E W on ({β}, ∅, β). By Pref1 (Deﬁnition 10), at least one such
attack succeeds as a defeat. Since the unassailable Z cannot itself
be defeated by an argument in E, then this contradicts W ∈ E is
acceptable w.r.t. E. QED
[5]’s closure under strict rules postulate states that if conc(E) 
α, then there is an argument X in E that concludes α. This postulate
is stated for pDCF s, under the assumption that resources sufﬁce
to construct such an X . We refrain from mentioning [5]’s indirect
consistency postulate as this immediately follows from direct consis-
tency and closure under strict rules. Note however that (together with
P2 and P3) the proofs of direct consistency and closure indicate that
if resources sufﬁce to recognise inconsistency in a set of premises,
either through use of these premises in constructing an argument
concluding ⊥, or arguments with conﬂicting conclusions, then this
sufﬁces to ensure satisfaction of the rationality postulates.
Theorem 11 [Closure under Strict Rules] Let E be a complete ex-
tension of a pDCF (A, C,≺),E′ ⊆ E, and conc(E′)  α. Suppose
there exists a X = (Δ, ∅, φ) ∈ A such that Δ = prem(E′). Then
X ∈ E.
PROOF. Suppose Y ⇒E∪{X} X on some X ′ = ({α}, ∅, α).
prem(X) ⊆ prem(E) implies supp(Y ) ⊆ prem(E). Hence since
α ∈ prem(E), ∃X ′′ ∈ E s.t. Y ⇒E∪{X′′} X ′′ on X ′. Since E is
complete ∃Z ∈ E s.t. Z ⇒{Y } Y . Hence X is acceptable w.r.t. E.
Since E is complete, X ∈ E. QED
Finally, the contamination postulates – non-interference and crash
resistance [6] – essentially state that the conclusions of arguments
in complete extensions of an AF deﬁned by B1 are preserved when
unioning some B2 with B1, such that the propositional atoms in B2
are disjoint from those in B1. However, [6] does not account for the
use of preferences. For pDCFs, we also need to refer to the prefer-
ences over arguments deﬁned by the union of B1 and B2, such that
the preference relations over arguments deﬁned for each of B1 and
B2 are preserved. In what follows, we deﬁne a composition operator
for pDCF s, and assume the same resources are available for con-
structing arguments from B1, B2 and B = B1 ∪ B2, so that for A
deﬁned by B, (A1∪A2) ⊆ A. Also, if resources sufﬁce to construct
a ‘tautological’ argument X = (∅, ∅, α) from B1 (B2), then X can
also be constructed from B2 (B1) and B.
Deﬁnition 11 Let (A1, C1,≺1) be deﬁned by B1, (A2, C2,≺2) de-
ﬁned by B2. Then (A, C,≺) = (A1, C1,≺1)⊕ (A2, C2,≺2), iff:
1. A1 ∪ A2 ⊆ A (it is obvious to see that (C1 ∪ C2) ⊆ C).
2. ∀X = (∅, ∅, α) : X ∈ A1 iff X ∈ A2 iff X ∈ A.
3. ≺ is any preference ordering such that:
• ∀X1, Y1 ∈ A1 : (X1, Y1) ∈≺1 iff (X1, Y1) ∈≺
• ∀X2, Y2 ∈ A2 : (X2, Y2) ∈≺2 iff (X2, Y2) ∈≺
In Section 3.2 we informally described how the contaminating ef-
fect of inconsistent arguments is avoided in our approach. However,
contamination may also arise as a result of dropping the subset min-
imality check on arguments.
Example 12 Let B1 = {p,¬p} and B2 = {s}, and :
• A1 =
{X1 = ({p}, ∅, p), X ′1 = (∅, {p}, p), Y1 = ({p}, {¬p},⊥),
X2 = ({¬p}, ∅,¬p), X ′2 = (∅, {¬p},¬p), Y2 = ({¬p}, {p},⊥),
Z = ({¬p, p}, ∅,⊥), U = (∅, {¬p, p},⊥)}.
Suppose also that X2 ≺1 X1. Then X2 E1 X1, and Y2 E1 X1
(since by Pref2 Y2 ≺1 X1), and Z E1 X1 (Z ≺1 X1 since ≺1 is
imle). E1 = {X1, X ′1, X ′2, Y1, U} is the single complete (grounded
and preferred) extension.
E2 = {X2, X ′2, Y2, U} is not admissible, since X2 and Y2 are both
defeated by X1 and Y1, and neither defeats can be defended.
• A2 = {S = ({s}, ∅, s), S′ = (∅, {s}, s)}, and ≺2= ∅.
• (A, C,≺) = (A1, C1,≺1)⊕ (A2, C2,≺2), whereA = A1∪A2 ∪
{C = ({¬p, s}, ∅,¬p), Z′ = ({¬p, s, p}, ∅,⊥)} and their logically
equivalent arguments, and ≺=≺111. Now, we obtain two preferred
extensions:
E′1 that is a superset of E1 and contains S and S′;
E′2 that is a superset of E2 and contains S, S′ and C.
We obtain the additionalE′2 becauseX2 and Y2 are now defended by
C, since C ⊀ X1 and so C ⇒{X1} X1. Furthermore, the grounded
extension E now contains S (recall that U ∈ E will defend against
Z’s (and Z′’s) defeat on S) but not P . Hence, contamination has
taken place since adding the syntactically disjoint s has changed the
credulously and sceptically deﬁned consequences of (A1, C1,≺1).
The problem here is that by adding premise s to X2 to obtain C,
X2 has been strengthened, since (given ≺=≺1) X2 ≺ X1 but C ⊀
X1. However, the strengthening of X2 is clearly counter-intuitive,
since s is an irrelevant premise in C. Thus we would expect that
C ≺ X1. Given this latter preference, we then obtain that E′1 is the
single complete (grounded and preferred) extension of (A, C,≺).
Hence, preference relations must satisfy the following property in
order to prevent contamination
Deﬁnition 12 Let (A, C,≺) be a pDCF . Then ≺ is relevance
coherent iff ∀X,Y, Y ′ such that
Y = (Γ, ∅, α), Y ′ = (Δ∪Γ, ∅, α), and Δ‖Γ∪ {α} (Δ syntacti-
cally disjoint from Γ ∪ {α}): if Y ≺ X then Y ′ ≺ X .
Of course, relevance coherence is trivially satisﬁed by proof the-
ories that preclude construction of arguments with syntactically dis-
joint premises [10]. Note also that one can straightforwardly show
that the Elitist ≺El is relevance coherent.
The following results assume pDCF s whose preference relations
are dialectically and relevance coherent. In [6, 22], the crash resis-
tance and non-interference postulates are formulated w.r.t. the ‘con-
sequences’ of an AF. We analogously deﬁne the consequences of
pDCF s, and state satisfaction of the postulates for the complete (and
hence grounded, preferred and stable) semantics (recall that conc(E)
denotes the conclusions of unconditional arguments).
11 Note that all three pDCF s satisfy P1 – P4 in Deﬁnition 7.
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Deﬁnition 13 Let (A, C,≺) be a pDCF . Then Cn((A, C,)) =
{conc(E1), . . . , conc(En)} whereE1, . . . , En are the complete ex-
tensions of (A, C,≺).
Non-interference states that the consequences of a pDCF deﬁned
by a base B1, restricted to the atoms in B1, remain unchanged in the
pDCF deﬁned by the union of B1 and a syntactically disjoint B2.
Theorem 13 [Non Interference] Let B1‖B2, (A, C,≺) =
(A1, C1,1)⊕ (A2, C2,≺2). Then:
Cn((A1, C1,1))|atoms(B1) = Cn((A, C,))|atoms(B1)12.
PROOF. See [11, Theorem 37]. QED
Referring to Example 12, Cn((A1, C1,≺1))|atoms(B1) = {{p}}.
If ≺ is not relevance coherent then Cn((A, C,≺))|atoms(B1) =
{{p}, {¬p}}. However, assuming relevance coherence, then C ≺
X1, C {X1} X1, E
′
2 is not a complete extension of (A, C,), and
so Cn((A, C,≺))|atoms(B1) = {{p}}.
Deﬁnition 14 A base B1 is said to be contaminating iff there exists
a (A1, C1,≺1) deﬁned by B1, such that for any B2 and (A2, C2,≺2)
deﬁned by B2, where B1‖B2: Cn((A1, C1,≺1)) = Cn((A, C,≺)),
where (A, C,≺) = (A1, C1,≺1) ⊕ (A2, C2,≺2).
Theorem 14 [Crash Resistance] There does not exist a contami-
nating base B.
PROOF. See [11, Theorem 39]. QED
Referring to Example 12, Cn((A1, C1,≺1)) = {{p}} =
Cn((A, C,≺)) = {{p, s}}.
5 Conclusions
This paper has argued that features of propositional classical logic
instantiations of AF s (ClAr) that sufﬁce to ensure satisfaction of ra-
tionality postulates, preclude uses of argument characteristic of real-
world dialectical reasoning by resource bounded agents. Our solution
has been to provide an account of ClAr in which the ontology of clas-
sical logic arguments explicitly distinguishes between an argument’s
premises assumed true, and those supposed true for the sake of ar-
gument. In so doing, we obviate the need for checking consistency
and subset minimality of premises, and identify an intuitive set of as-
sumptions on the available resources for constructing arguments for
inclusion in a framework, and show that the resulting formalism sat-
isﬁes the closure, consistency, non-interference and crash resistance
postulates. We thus provide a rational account of ClAr that is suit-
able for use by resource bounded agents. Our account also avoids
the foreign commitment problem, and formalises the real-world use
of argument in dialectically demonstrating that an agent’s premises
are inconsistent. We have shown that key properties of Dung’s theory
are preserved, and we provide an argumentative characterisation of
the Preferred Subtheories non-monotonic logic, under the assump-
tion that agents have limited inferential capabilities.
[14] also identify requirements for practical applications of argu-
mentation. They stipulate that the computational cost of validating
the legitimacy of a constructed argument should be at most poly-
nomial (in the size of the arguments), and whether an argument at-
tacks another should be at most linear (in the size of the argument’s
conclusion). Both are satisﬁed by our approach (the former trivially
since we drop checks on premises). [14] also argue that an argu-
ment’s premises should be relevant to its conclusion. Although we
12 Recall Notation 3
drop the subset minimality check, we suggest that the issue of rele-
vance should be addressed by the speciﬁc proof theoretic means for
constructing arguments.
Pragmatic considerations also motivate dropping consistency and
subset minimality checks on arguments in [3]. Arguments are
Gentzen style sequents and arguments with inconsistent premises
are attacked by sequents with empty antecedents. In this work,
the distinction between premises and suppositions, and the use of
preferences are not considered. The postulates in [5] are not stud-
ied and neither is there consideration of argumentation under re-
source bounds. Finally, [7] also distinguish between premises and
suppositions, but in a restricted logical setting (arguments are con-
structed from literals and defeasible rules). This work studies only
the grounded semantics, does not consider preferences or investigate
satisfaction of the rationality postulates.
A number of works show satisfaction of the non-interference and
crash resistance postulates for argumentation formalisms that inte-
grate deductive and defeasible reasoning. [6] show that logic pro-
gramming and Default Logic instantiations of Dung frameworks sat-
isfy these postulates under the semi-stable semantics. In [22], argu-
ments are built from a set of classically consistent propositional for-
mulae, and defeasible and strict inference rules. [22] do not consider
the use of preferences, and show satisfaction of the postulates un-
der the assumption that inconsistent arguments (identiﬁed as those
whose contained premises together with the conclusions of defea-
sible rules are classically inconsistent) are excluded from the argu-
mentation framework. Finally, [12] deﬁne a version of the ASPIC+
framework [18] in which the strict inference rules encode inference
in [20]’s paraconsistent logic. The focus of [12] is on showing sat-
isfaction of the closure and consistency postulates, and satisfaction
of non-interference and crash resistance is not formally shown (the
authors state that satisfaction of these postulates can be taken for
granted given the absence of the Ex Falso principle). Finally, we have
identiﬁed that contamination may result if one does not implement
the subset minimality check on an argument’s premises. While we
drop the subset minimality check, we identify a notion of relevance
that is more readily addressed by classical proof theories. For proof
theories that do not exclude construction of arguments making use of
irrelevant premises, we show that contamination is avoided if pref-
erence relations do not strengthen arguments upon addition of irrel-
evant premises (one such preference relation being the widely used
Elitist preference). This result is closely related to a result shown
in [18], which states that the argumentation deﬁned consequences
of a framework remain unchanged if one additionally includes non-
subset minimal arguments, provided that they are not stronger than
their subset minimal counterparts.
With regard to future research directions, we recognise that while
we accommodate agents who resources are bounded with respect to
the construction of arguments, we need to investigate the complex-
ity of computing semantics (i.e, evaluation of arguments) given our
dialectical deﬁnition of attacks (defeats) on arguments. Finally, we
are currently extending our dialectical formulation of arguments and
acceptability to the ASPIC+ framework [18]. ASPIC+ is a general
framework for structured argumentation that accommodates argu-
ments built from strict inference rules that encode the inference re-
lations of deductive logics, as well as defeasible inference rules. We
thus aim to provide a general account of structured argumentation for
use by real-world resource bounded agents.
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